You cannot select more than 25 topics
Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
1206 lines
35 KiB
Diff
1206 lines
35 KiB
Diff
From 223db480c54de8ec47b3b0b4c6066b58342a5ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
From: Radu Alexe <radu.alexe@nxp.com>
|
|
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 16:17:13 +0300
|
|
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: add support for TLS 1.0 record encryption
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
|
|
|
This patch adds kernel support for encryption/decryption of TLS 1.0
|
|
records using block ciphers. Implementation is similar to authenc in the
|
|
sense that the base algorithms (AES, SHA1) are combined in a template to
|
|
produce TLS encapsulation frames. The composite algorithm will be called
|
|
"tls10(hmac(<digest>),cbc(<cipher>))". The cipher and hmac keys are
|
|
wrapped in the same format used by authenc.c.
|
|
|
|
Signed-off-by: Radu Alexe <radu.alexe@nxp.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
|
|
---
|
|
crypto/Kconfig | 20 ++
|
|
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
|
|
crypto/tcrypt.c | 3 +
|
|
crypto/testmgr.c | 238 ++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
crypto/testmgr.h | 224 ++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
crypto/tls.c | 607 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
|
6 files changed, 1093 insertions(+)
|
|
create mode 100644 crypto/tls.c
|
|
|
|
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
|
|
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
|
|
@@ -342,6 +342,26 @@ config CRYPTO_ECHAINIV
|
|
a sequence number xored with a salt. This is the default
|
|
algorithm for CBC.
|
|
|
|
+config CRYPTO_TLS
|
|
+ tristate "TLS support"
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_NULL
|
|
+ select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
|
|
+ help
|
|
+ Support for TLS 1.0 record encryption and decryption
|
|
+
|
|
+ This module adds support for encryption/decryption of TLS 1.0 frames
|
|
+ using blockcipher algorithms. The name of the resulting algorithm is
|
|
+ "tls10(hmac(<digest>),cbc(<cipher>))". By default, the generic base
|
|
+ algorithms are used (e.g. aes-generic, sha1-generic), but hardware
|
|
+ accelerated versions will be used automatically if available.
|
|
+
|
|
+ User-space applications (OpenSSL, GnuTLS) can offload TLS 1.0
|
|
+ operations through AF_ALG or cryptodev interfaces
|
|
+
|
|
comment "Block modes"
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CBC
|
|
--- a/crypto/Makefile
|
|
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
|
|
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32) += crc32_gene
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF) += crct10dif_common.o crct10dif_generic.o
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC) += authenc.o authencesn.o
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO) += lzo.o lzo-rle.o
|
|
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TLS) += tls.o
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4) += lz4.o
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4HC) += lz4hc.o
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XXHASH) += xxhash_generic.o
|
|
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
|
|
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
|
|
@@ -2049,6 +2049,9 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32
|
|
ret += tcrypt_test("cbc(sm4)");
|
|
ret += tcrypt_test("ctr(sm4)");
|
|
break;
|
|
+ case 192:
|
|
+ ret += tcrypt_test("tls10(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))");
|
|
+ break;
|
|
case 200:
|
|
test_cipher_speed("ecb(aes)", ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
|
|
speed_template_16_24_32);
|
|
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
|
|
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
|
|
@@ -111,6 +111,13 @@ struct drbg_test_suite {
|
|
unsigned int count;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
+struct tls_test_suite {
|
|
+ struct {
|
|
+ struct tls_testvec *vecs;
|
|
+ unsigned int count;
|
|
+ } enc, dec;
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
struct akcipher_test_suite {
|
|
const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs;
|
|
unsigned int count;
|
|
@@ -135,6 +142,7 @@ struct alg_test_desc {
|
|
struct hash_test_suite hash;
|
|
struct cprng_test_suite cprng;
|
|
struct drbg_test_suite drbg;
|
|
+ struct tls_test_suite tls;
|
|
struct akcipher_test_suite akcipher;
|
|
struct kpp_test_suite kpp;
|
|
} suite;
|
|
@@ -2294,6 +2302,227 @@ static int test_aead(const char *driver,
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+static int __test_tls(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
|
|
+ struct tls_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount,
|
|
+ const bool diff_dst)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm));
|
|
+ unsigned int i, k, authsize;
|
|
+ char *q;
|
|
+ struct aead_request *req;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *sgout;
|
|
+ const char *e, *d;
|
|
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
|
|
+ void *input;
|
|
+ void *output;
|
|
+ void *assoc;
|
|
+ char *iv;
|
|
+ char *key;
|
|
+ char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
|
|
+ char *xoutbuf[XBUFSIZE];
|
|
+ char *axbuf[XBUFSIZE];
|
|
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
|
|
+ goto out_noxbuf;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (diff_dst && testmgr_alloc_buf(xoutbuf))
|
|
+ goto out_nooutbuf;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (testmgr_alloc_buf(axbuf))
|
|
+ goto out_noaxbuf;
|
|
+
|
|
+ iv = kzalloc(MAX_IVLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
+ if (!iv)
|
|
+ goto out_noiv;
|
|
+
|
|
+ key = kzalloc(MAX_KEYLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
+ if (!key)
|
|
+ goto out_nokey;
|
|
+
|
|
+ sg = kmalloc(sizeof(*sg) * 8 * (diff_dst ? 2 : 1), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
+ if (!sg)
|
|
+ goto out_nosg;
|
|
+
|
|
+ sgout = sg + 8;
|
|
+
|
|
+ d = diff_dst ? "-ddst" : "";
|
|
+ e = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
|
|
+
|
|
+ req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
+ if (!req) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: tls%s: Failed to allocate request for %s\n",
|
|
+ d, algo);
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
|
|
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
|
|
+
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
|
|
+ input = xbuf[0];
|
|
+ assoc = axbuf[0];
|
|
+
|
|
+ ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
+ if (WARN_ON(template[i].ilen > PAGE_SIZE ||
|
|
+ template[i].alen > PAGE_SIZE))
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+
|
|
+ memcpy(assoc, template[i].assoc, template[i].alen);
|
|
+ memcpy(input, template[i].input, template[i].ilen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (template[i].iv)
|
|
+ memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, MAX_IVLEN);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (template[i].klen > MAX_KEYLEN) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: aead%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
|
|
+ d, i, algo, template[i].klen, MAX_KEYLEN);
|
|
+ ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].klen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].klen);
|
|
+ if (!ret == template[i].fail) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: tls%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
|
|
+ d, i, algo, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ } else if (ret)
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
+
|
|
+ authsize = 20;
|
|
+ ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: aead%s: Failed to set authsize to %u on test %d for %s\n",
|
|
+ d, authsize, i, algo);
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ k = !!template[i].alen;
|
|
+ sg_init_table(sg, k + 1);
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], assoc, template[i].alen);
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[k], input, (enc ? template[i].rlen :
|
|
+ template[i].ilen));
|
|
+ output = input;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (diff_dst) {
|
|
+ sg_init_table(sgout, k + 1);
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], assoc, template[i].alen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ output = xoutbuf[0];
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(&sgout[k], output,
|
|
+ (enc ? template[i].rlen : template[i].ilen));
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
|
|
+ template[i].ilen, iv);
|
|
+
|
|
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, template[i].alen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
|
|
+ : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
|
|
+
|
|
+ switch (ret) {
|
|
+ case 0:
|
|
+ if (template[i].novrfy) {
|
|
+ /* verification was supposed to fail */
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: tls%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret was 0, expected -EBADMSG\n",
|
|
+ d, e, i, algo);
|
|
+ /* so really, we got a bad message */
|
|
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ case -EBADMSG:
|
|
+ /* verification failure was expected */
|
|
+ if (template[i].novrfy)
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
+ /* fall through */
|
|
+ default:
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: tls%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
|
|
+ d, e, i, algo, -ret);
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ q = output;
|
|
+ if (memcmp(q, template[i].result, template[i].rlen)) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: tls%s: Test %d failed on %s for %s\n",
|
|
+ d, i, e, algo);
|
|
+ hexdump(q, template[i].rlen);
|
|
+ pr_err("should be:\n");
|
|
+ hexdump(template[i].result, template[i].rlen);
|
|
+ ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ aead_request_free(req);
|
|
+
|
|
+ kfree(sg);
|
|
+out_nosg:
|
|
+ kfree(key);
|
|
+out_nokey:
|
|
+ kfree(iv);
|
|
+out_noiv:
|
|
+ testmgr_free_buf(axbuf);
|
|
+out_noaxbuf:
|
|
+ if (diff_dst)
|
|
+ testmgr_free_buf(xoutbuf);
|
|
+out_nooutbuf:
|
|
+ testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
|
|
+out_noxbuf:
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int test_tls(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
|
|
+ struct tls_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ int ret;
|
|
+ /* test 'dst == src' case */
|
|
+ ret = __test_tls(tfm, enc, template, tcount, false);
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
+ /* test 'dst != src' case */
|
|
+ return __test_tls(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int alg_test_tls(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
|
|
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
|
|
+ int err = 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
|
|
+ pr_err("alg: aead: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
|
|
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (desc->suite.tls.enc.vecs) {
|
|
+ err = test_tls(tfm, ENCRYPT, desc->suite.tls.enc.vecs,
|
|
+ desc->suite.tls.enc.count);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!err && desc->suite.tls.dec.vecs)
|
|
+ err = test_tls(tfm, DECRYPT, desc->suite.tls.dec.vecs,
|
|
+ desc->suite.tls.dec.count);
|
|
+
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
|
|
u32 type, u32 mask)
|
|
{
|
|
@@ -5012,6 +5241,15 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_te
|
|
.hash = __VECS(tgr192_tv_template)
|
|
}
|
|
}, {
|
|
+ .alg = "tls10(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
|
|
+ .test = alg_test_tls,
|
|
+ .suite = {
|
|
+ .tls = {
|
|
+ .enc = __VECS(tls_enc_tv_template),
|
|
+ .dec = __VECS(tls_dec_tv_template)
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }, {
|
|
.alg = "vmac64(aes)",
|
|
.test = alg_test_hash,
|
|
.suite = {
|
|
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
|
|
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
|
|
@@ -21,7 +21,12 @@
|
|
#define _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
|
|
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
|
|
|
|
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
|
|
+#define MAX_TAP 8
|
|
+
|
|
+#define MAX_KEYLEN 160
|
|
#define MAX_IVLEN 32
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
@@ -140,6 +145,20 @@ struct drbg_testvec {
|
|
size_t expectedlen;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
+struct tls_testvec {
|
|
+ char *key; /* wrapped keys for encryption and authentication */
|
|
+ char *iv; /* initialization vector */
|
|
+ char *input; /* input data */
|
|
+ char *assoc; /* associated data: seq num, type, version, input len */
|
|
+ char *result; /* result data */
|
|
+ unsigned char fail; /* the test failure is expected */
|
|
+ unsigned char novrfy; /* dec verification failure expected */
|
|
+ unsigned char klen; /* key length */
|
|
+ unsigned short ilen; /* input data length */
|
|
+ unsigned short alen; /* associated data length */
|
|
+ unsigned short rlen; /* result length */
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
struct akcipher_testvec {
|
|
const unsigned char *key;
|
|
const unsigned char *params;
|
|
@@ -171,6 +190,211 @@ struct kpp_testvec {
|
|
static const char zeroed_string[48];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
+ * TLS1.0 synthetic test vectors
|
|
+ */
|
|
+static struct tls_testvec tls_enc_tv_template[] = {
|
|
+ {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "Single block msg",
|
|
+ .ilen = 16,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x00\x10",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "\xd5\xac\xb\xd2\xac\xad\x3f\xb1"
|
|
+ "\x59\x79\x1e\x91\x5f\x52\x14\x9c"
|
|
+ "\xc0\x75\xd8\x4c\x97\x0f\x07\x73"
|
|
+ "\xdc\x89\x47\x49\x49\xcb\x30\x6b"
|
|
+ "\x1b\x45\x23\xa1\xd0\x51\xcf\x02"
|
|
+ "\x2e\xa8\x5d\xa0\xfe\xca\x82\x61",
|
|
+ .rlen = 16 + 20 + 12,
|
|
+ }, {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "",
|
|
+ .ilen = 0,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x00\x00",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "\x58\x2a\x11\xc\x86\x8e\x4b\x67"
|
|
+ "\x2d\x16\x26\x1a\xac\x4b\xe2\x1a"
|
|
+ "\xe9\x6a\xcc\x4d\x6f\x79\x8a\x45"
|
|
+ "\x1f\x4e\x27\xf2\xa7\x59\xb4\x5a",
|
|
+ .rlen = 20 + 12,
|
|
+ }, {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285"
|
|
+ " bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285"
|
|
+ " bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285"
|
|
+ " bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext",
|
|
+ .ilen = 285,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x01\x1d",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "\x80\x23\x82\x44\x14\x2a\x1d\x94\xc\xc2\x1d\xd"
|
|
+ "\x3a\x32\x89\x4c\x57\x30\xa8\x89\x76\x46\xcc\x90"
|
|
+ "\x1d\x88\xb8\xa6\x1a\x58\xe\x2d\xeb\x2c\xc7\x3a"
|
|
+ "\x52\x4e\xdb\xb3\x1e\x83\x11\xf5\x3c\xce\x6e\x94"
|
|
+ "\xd3\x26\x6a\x9a\xd\xbd\xc7\x98\xb9\xb3\x3a\x51"
|
|
+ "\x1e\x4\x84\x8a\x8f\x54\x9a\x51\x69\x9c\xce\x31"
|
|
+ "\x8d\x5d\x8b\xee\x5f\x70\xc\xc9\xb8\x50\x54\xf8"
|
|
+ "\xb2\x4a\x7a\xcd\xeb\x7a\x82\x81\xc6\x41\xc8\x50"
|
|
+ "\x91\x8d\xc8\xed\xcd\x40\x8f\x55\xd1\xec\xc9\xac"
|
|
+ "\x15\x18\xf9\x20\xa0\xed\x18\xa1\xe3\x56\xe3\x14"
|
|
+ "\xe5\xe8\x66\x63\x20\xed\xe4\x62\x9d\xa3\xa4\x1d"
|
|
+ "\x81\x89\x18\xf2\x36\xae\xc8\x8a\x2b\xbc\xc3\xb8"
|
|
+ "\x80\xf\x97\x21\x36\x39\x8\x84\x23\x18\x9e\x9c"
|
|
+ "\x72\x32\x75\x2d\x2e\xf9\x60\xb\xe8\xcc\xd9\x74"
|
|
+ "\x4\x1b\x8e\x99\xc1\x94\xee\xd0\xac\x4e\xfc\x7e"
|
|
+ "\xf1\x96\xb3\xe7\x14\xb8\xf2\xc\x25\x97\x82\x6b"
|
|
+ "\xbd\x0\x65\xab\x5c\xe3\x16\xfb\x68\xef\xea\x9d"
|
|
+ "\xff\x44\x1d\x2a\x44\xf5\xc8\x56\x77\xb7\xbf\x13"
|
|
+ "\xc8\x54\xdb\x92\xfe\x16\x4c\xbe\x18\xe9\xb\x8d"
|
|
+ "\xb\xd4\x43\x58\x43\xaa\xf4\x3\x80\x97\x62\xd5"
|
|
+ "\xdf\x3c\x28\xaa\xee\x48\x4b\x55\x41\x1b\x31\x2"
|
|
+ "\xbe\xa0\x1c\xbd\xb7\x22\x2a\xe5\x53\x72\x73\x20"
|
|
+ "\x44\x4f\xe6\x1\x2b\x34\x33\x11\x7d\xfb\x10\xc1"
|
|
+ "\x66\x7c\xa6\xf4\x48\x36\x5e\x2\xda\x41\x4b\x3e"
|
|
+ "\xe7\x80\x17\x17\xce\xf1\x3e\x6a\x8e\x26\xf3\xb7"
|
|
+ "\x2b\x85\xd\x31\x8d\xba\x6c\x22\xb4\x28\x55\x7e"
|
|
+ "\x2a\x9e\x26\xf1\x3d\x21\xac\x65",
|
|
+ .rlen = 285 + 20 + 15,
|
|
+ }
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+static struct tls_testvec tls_dec_tv_template[] = {
|
|
+ {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "\xd5\xac\xb\xd2\xac\xad\x3f\xb1"
|
|
+ "\x59\x79\x1e\x91\x5f\x52\x14\x9c"
|
|
+ "\xc0\x75\xd8\x4c\x97\x0f\x07\x73"
|
|
+ "\xdc\x89\x47\x49\x49\xcb\x30\x6b"
|
|
+ "\x1b\x45\x23\xa1\xd0\x51\xcf\x02"
|
|
+ "\x2e\xa8\x5d\xa0\xfe\xca\x82\x61",
|
|
+ .ilen = 16 + 20 + 12,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x00\x30",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "Single block msg",
|
|
+ .rlen = 16,
|
|
+ }, {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "\x58\x2a\x11\xc\x86\x8e\x4b\x67"
|
|
+ "\x2d\x16\x26\x1a\xac\x4b\xe2\x1a"
|
|
+ "\xe9\x6a\xcc\x4d\x6f\x79\x8a\x45"
|
|
+ "\x1f\x4e\x27\xf2\xa7\x59\xb4\x5a",
|
|
+ .ilen = 20 + 12,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x00\x20",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "",
|
|
+ .rlen = 0,
|
|
+ }, {
|
|
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
+ .key = "\x08\x00" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x01\x00" /* rta type */
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ .key = "\x00\x08" /* rta length */
|
|
+ "\x00\x01" /* rta type */
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x10" /* enc key length */
|
|
+ "authenticationkey20benckeyis16_bytes",
|
|
+ .klen = 8 + 20 + 16,
|
|
+ .iv = "iv0123456789abcd",
|
|
+ .input = "\x80\x23\x82\x44\x14\x2a\x1d\x94\xc\xc2\x1d\xd"
|
|
+ "\x3a\x32\x89\x4c\x57\x30\xa8\x89\x76\x46\xcc\x90"
|
|
+ "\x1d\x88\xb8\xa6\x1a\x58\xe\x2d\xeb\x2c\xc7\x3a"
|
|
+ "\x52\x4e\xdb\xb3\x1e\x83\x11\xf5\x3c\xce\x6e\x94"
|
|
+ "\xd3\x26\x6a\x9a\xd\xbd\xc7\x98\xb9\xb3\x3a\x51"
|
|
+ "\x1e\x4\x84\x8a\x8f\x54\x9a\x51\x69\x9c\xce\x31"
|
|
+ "\x8d\x5d\x8b\xee\x5f\x70\xc\xc9\xb8\x50\x54\xf8"
|
|
+ "\xb2\x4a\x7a\xcd\xeb\x7a\x82\x81\xc6\x41\xc8\x50"
|
|
+ "\x91\x8d\xc8\xed\xcd\x40\x8f\x55\xd1\xec\xc9\xac"
|
|
+ "\x15\x18\xf9\x20\xa0\xed\x18\xa1\xe3\x56\xe3\x14"
|
|
+ "\xe5\xe8\x66\x63\x20\xed\xe4\x62\x9d\xa3\xa4\x1d"
|
|
+ "\x81\x89\x18\xf2\x36\xae\xc8\x8a\x2b\xbc\xc3\xb8"
|
|
+ "\x80\xf\x97\x21\x36\x39\x8\x84\x23\x18\x9e\x9c"
|
|
+ "\x72\x32\x75\x2d\x2e\xf9\x60\xb\xe8\xcc\xd9\x74"
|
|
+ "\x4\x1b\x8e\x99\xc1\x94\xee\xd0\xac\x4e\xfc\x7e"
|
|
+ "\xf1\x96\xb3\xe7\x14\xb8\xf2\xc\x25\x97\x82\x6b"
|
|
+ "\xbd\x0\x65\xab\x5c\xe3\x16\xfb\x68\xef\xea\x9d"
|
|
+ "\xff\x44\x1d\x2a\x44\xf5\xc8\x56\x77\xb7\xbf\x13"
|
|
+ "\xc8\x54\xdb\x92\xfe\x16\x4c\xbe\x18\xe9\xb\x8d"
|
|
+ "\xb\xd4\x43\x58\x43\xaa\xf4\x3\x80\x97\x62\xd5"
|
|
+ "\xdf\x3c\x28\xaa\xee\x48\x4b\x55\x41\x1b\x31\x2"
|
|
+ "\xbe\xa0\x1c\xbd\xb7\x22\x2a\xe5\x53\x72\x73\x20"
|
|
+ "\x44\x4f\xe6\x1\x2b\x34\x33\x11\x7d\xfb\x10\xc1"
|
|
+ "\x66\x7c\xa6\xf4\x48\x36\x5e\x2\xda\x41\x4b\x3e"
|
|
+ "\xe7\x80\x17\x17\xce\xf1\x3e\x6a\x8e\x26\xf3\xb7"
|
|
+ "\x2b\x85\xd\x31\x8d\xba\x6c\x22\xb4\x28\x55\x7e"
|
|
+ "\x2a\x9e\x26\xf1\x3d\x21\xac\x65",
|
|
+
|
|
+ .ilen = 285 + 20 + 15,
|
|
+ .assoc = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
|
|
+ "\x00\x03\x01\x01\x40",
|
|
+ .alen = 13,
|
|
+ .result = "285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285"
|
|
+ " bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285"
|
|
+ " bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes"
|
|
+ " plaintext285 bytes plaintext285 bytes plaintext",
|
|
+ .rlen = 285,
|
|
+ }
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+/*
|
|
* RSA test vectors. Borrowed from openSSL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static const struct akcipher_testvec rsa_tv_template[] = {
|
|
--- /dev/null
|
|
+++ b/crypto/tls.c
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,607 @@
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Copyright 2013 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
|
|
+ * Copyright 2017 NXP Semiconductor, Inc.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
|
|
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
|
|
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
|
|
+ * any later version.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
|
|
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
|
|
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
|
|
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
|
|
+#include <crypto/null.h>
|
|
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
|
|
+#include <linux/err.h>
|
|
+#include <linux/init.h>
|
|
+#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+struct tls_instance_ctx {
|
|
+ struct crypto_ahash_spawn auth;
|
|
+ struct crypto_skcipher_spawn enc;
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+struct crypto_tls_ctx {
|
|
+ unsigned int reqoff;
|
|
+ struct crypto_ahash *auth;
|
|
+ struct crypto_skcipher *enc;
|
|
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null;
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+struct tls_request_ctx {
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * cryptlen holds the payload length in the case of encryption or
|
|
+ * payload_len + icv_len + padding_len in case of decryption
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ unsigned int cryptlen;
|
|
+ /* working space for partial results */
|
|
+ struct scatterlist tmp[2];
|
|
+ struct scatterlist cipher[2];
|
|
+ struct scatterlist dst[2];
|
|
+ char tail[];
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+struct async_op {
|
|
+ struct completion completion;
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+static void tls_async_op_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct async_op *areq = req->data;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
|
|
+ return;
|
|
+
|
|
+ areq->err = err;
|
|
+ complete(&areq->completion);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tls, const u8 *key,
|
|
+ unsigned int keylen)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
|
|
+ struct crypto_ahash *auth = ctx->auth;
|
|
+ struct crypto_skcipher *enc = ctx->enc;
|
|
+ struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
|
|
+ int err = -EINVAL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0)
|
|
+ goto badkey;
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_clear_flags(auth, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_set_flags(auth, crypto_aead_get_flags(tls) &
|
|
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
+ err = crypto_ahash_setkey(auth, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen);
|
|
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, crypto_ahash_get_flags(auth) &
|
|
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(enc, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(enc, crypto_aead_get_flags(tls) &
|
|
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
|
|
+ err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(enc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen);
|
|
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(enc) &
|
|
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
|
|
+
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+
|
|
+badkey:
|
|
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tls, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/**
|
|
+ * crypto_tls_genicv - Calculate hmac digest for a TLS record
|
|
+ * @hash: (output) buffer to save the digest into
|
|
+ * @src: (input) scatterlist with the assoc and payload data
|
|
+ * @srclen: (input) size of the source buffer (assoclen + cryptlen)
|
|
+ * @req: (input) aead request
|
|
+ **/
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_genicv(u8 *hash, struct scatterlist *src,
|
|
+ unsigned int srclen, struct aead_request *req)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
|
|
+ struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
+ struct async_op ahash_op;
|
|
+ struct ahash_request *ahreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
|
|
+ unsigned int flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
|
|
+ int err = -EBADMSG;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Bail out if the request assoc len is 0 */
|
|
+ if (!req->assoclen)
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ init_completion(&ahash_op.completion);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* the hash transform to be executed comes from the original request */
|
|
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(ahreq, ctx->auth);
|
|
+ /* prepare the hash request with input data and result pointer */
|
|
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(ahreq, src, hash, srclen);
|
|
+ /* set the notifier for when the async hash function returns */
|
|
+ ahash_request_set_callback(ahreq, aead_request_flags(req) & flags,
|
|
+ tls_async_op_done, &ahash_op);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Calculate the digest on the given data. The result is put in hash */
|
|
+ err = crypto_ahash_digest(ahreq);
|
|
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
|
|
+ err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&ahash_op.completion);
|
|
+ if (!err)
|
|
+ err = ahash_op.err;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/**
|
|
+ * crypto_tls_gen_padicv - Calculate and pad hmac digest for a TLS record
|
|
+ * @hash: (output) buffer to save the digest and padding into
|
|
+ * @phashlen: (output) the size of digest + padding
|
|
+ * @req: (input) aead request
|
|
+ **/
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_gen_padicv(u8 *hash, unsigned int *phashlen,
|
|
+ struct aead_request *req)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
+ unsigned int hash_size = crypto_aead_authsize(tls);
|
|
+ unsigned int block_size = crypto_aead_blocksize(tls);
|
|
+ unsigned int srclen = req->cryptlen + hash_size;
|
|
+ unsigned int icvlen = req->cryptlen + req->assoclen;
|
|
+ unsigned int padlen;
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ err = crypto_tls_genicv(hash, req->src, icvlen, req);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* add padding after digest */
|
|
+ padlen = block_size - (srclen % block_size);
|
|
+ memset(hash + hash_size, padlen - 1, padlen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ *phashlen = hash_size + padlen;
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_copy_data(struct aead_request *req,
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *src,
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *dst,
|
|
+ unsigned int len)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
|
|
+ SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(skreq, ctx->null);
|
|
+
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(skreq, ctx->null);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
|
|
+ NULL, NULL);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst, len, NULL);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(skreq);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
|
|
+ struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
+ struct skcipher_request *skreq;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *cipher = treq_ctx->cipher;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *tmp = treq_ctx->tmp;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *sg, *src, *dst;
|
|
+ unsigned int cryptlen, phashlen;
|
|
+ u8 *hash = treq_ctx->tail;
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * The hash result is saved at the beginning of the tls request ctx
|
|
+ * and is aligned as required by the hash transform. Enough space was
|
|
+ * allocated in crypto_tls_init_tfm to accommodate the difference. The
|
|
+ * requests themselves start later at treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff so
|
|
+ * the result is not overwritten by the second (cipher) request.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ hash = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)hash +
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth),
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth) + 1);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * STEP 1: create ICV together with necessary padding
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ err = crypto_tls_gen_padicv(hash, &phashlen, req);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * STEP 2: Hash and padding are combined with the payload
|
|
+ * depending on the form it arrives. Scatter tables must have at least
|
|
+ * one page of data before chaining with another table and can't have
|
|
+ * an empty data page. The following code addresses these requirements.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * If the payload is empty, only the hash is encrypted, otherwise the
|
|
+ * payload scatterlist is merged with the hash. A special merging case
|
|
+ * is when the payload has only one page of data. In that case the
|
|
+ * payload page is moved to another scatterlist and prepared there for
|
|
+ * encryption.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (req->cryptlen) {
|
|
+ src = scatterwalk_ffwd(tmp, req->src, req->assoclen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ sg_init_table(cipher, 2);
|
|
+ sg_set_buf(cipher + 1, hash, phashlen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (sg_is_last(src)) {
|
|
+ sg_set_page(cipher, sg_page(src), req->cryptlen,
|
|
+ src->offset);
|
|
+ src = cipher;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ unsigned int rem_len = req->cryptlen;
|
|
+
|
|
+ for (sg = src; rem_len > sg->length; sg = sg_next(sg))
|
|
+ rem_len -= min(rem_len, sg->length);
|
|
+
|
|
+ sg_set_page(cipher, sg_page(sg), rem_len, sg->offset);
|
|
+ sg_chain(sg, 1, cipher);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ sg_init_one(cipher, hash, phashlen);
|
|
+ src = cipher;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /**
|
|
+ * If src != dst copy the associated data from source to destination.
|
|
+ * In both cases fast-forward passed the associated data in the dest.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
|
|
+ err = crypto_tls_copy_data(req, req->src, req->dst,
|
|
+ req->assoclen);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(treq_ctx->dst, req->dst, req->assoclen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * STEP 3: encrypt the frame and return the result
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ cryptlen = req->cryptlen + phashlen;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * The hash and the cipher are applied at different times and their
|
|
+ * requests can use the same memory space without interference
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ skreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->enc);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst, cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
|
|
+ req->base.complete, req->base.data);
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Apply the cipher transform. The result will be in req->dst when the
|
|
+ * asynchronuous call terminates
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(skreq);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_aead *tls = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tls);
|
|
+ struct tls_request_ctx *treq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
|
|
+ unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
|
|
+ unsigned int hash_size = crypto_aead_authsize(tls);
|
|
+ unsigned int block_size = crypto_aead_blocksize(tls);
|
|
+ struct skcipher_request *skreq = (void *)(treq_ctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *tmp = treq_ctx->tmp;
|
|
+ struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
|
|
+
|
|
+ u8 padding[255]; /* padding can be 0-255 bytes */
|
|
+ u8 pad_size;
|
|
+ u16 *len_field;
|
|
+ u8 *ihash, *hash = treq_ctx->tail;
|
|
+
|
|
+ int paderr = 0;
|
|
+ int err = -EINVAL;
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
+ struct async_op ciph_op;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Rule out bad packets. The input packet length must be at least one
|
|
+ * byte more than the hash_size
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (cryptlen <= hash_size || cryptlen % block_size)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Step 1 - Decrypt the source. Fast-forward past the associated data
|
|
+ * to the encrypted data. The result will be overwritten in place so
|
|
+ * that the decrypted data will be adjacent to the associated data. The
|
|
+ * last step (computing the hash) will have it's input data already
|
|
+ * prepared and ready to be accessed at req->src.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ src = scatterwalk_ffwd(tmp, req->src, req->assoclen);
|
|
+ dst = src;
|
|
+
|
|
+ init_completion(&ciph_op.completion);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->enc);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
|
|
+ tls_async_op_done, &ciph_op);
|
|
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst, cryptlen, req->iv);
|
|
+ err = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(skreq);
|
|
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
|
|
+ err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&ciph_op.completion);
|
|
+ if (!err)
|
|
+ err = ciph_op.err;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Step 2 - Verify padding
|
|
+ * Retrieve the last byte of the payload; this is the padding size.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ cryptlen -= 1;
|
|
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&pad_size, dst, cryptlen, 1, 0);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* RFC recommendation for invalid padding size. */
|
|
+ if (cryptlen < pad_size + hash_size) {
|
|
+ pad_size = 0;
|
|
+ paderr = -EBADMSG;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ cryptlen -= pad_size;
|
|
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(padding, dst, cryptlen, pad_size, 0);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Padding content must be equal with pad_size. We verify it all */
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < pad_size; i++)
|
|
+ if (padding[i] != pad_size)
|
|
+ paderr = -EBADMSG;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Step 3 - Verify hash
|
|
+ * Align the digest result as required by the hash transform. Enough
|
|
+ * space was allocated in crypto_tls_init_tfm
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ hash = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)hash +
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth),
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(ctx->auth) + 1);
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Two bytes at the end of the associated data make the length field.
|
|
+ * It must be updated with the length of the cleartext message before
|
|
+ * the hash is calculated.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ len_field = sg_virt(req->src) + req->assoclen - 2;
|
|
+ cryptlen -= hash_size;
|
|
+ *len_field = htons(cryptlen);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* This is the hash from the decrypted packet. Save it for later */
|
|
+ ihash = hash + hash_size;
|
|
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(ihash, dst, cryptlen, hash_size, 0);
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* Now compute and compare our ICV with the one from the packet */
|
|
+ err = crypto_tls_genicv(hash, req->src, cryptlen + req->assoclen, req);
|
|
+ if (!err)
|
|
+ err = memcmp(hash, ihash, hash_size) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
|
|
+ err = crypto_tls_copy_data(req, req->src, req->dst, cryptlen +
|
|
+ req->assoclen);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* return the first found error */
|
|
+ if (paderr)
|
|
+ err = paderr;
|
|
+
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
|
|
+ struct tls_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
+ struct crypto_ahash *auth;
|
|
+ struct crypto_skcipher *enc;
|
|
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null;
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ auth = crypto_spawn_ahash(&ictx->auth);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(auth))
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(auth);
|
|
+
|
|
+ enc = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->enc);
|
|
+ err = PTR_ERR(enc);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(enc))
|
|
+ goto err_free_ahash;
|
|
+
|
|
+ null = crypto_get_default_null_skcipher();
|
|
+ err = PTR_ERR(null);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(null))
|
|
+ goto err_free_skcipher;
|
|
+
|
|
+ ctx->auth = auth;
|
|
+ ctx->enc = enc;
|
|
+ ctx->null = null;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Allow enough space for two digests. The two digests will be compared
|
|
+ * during the decryption phase. One will come from the decrypted packet
|
|
+ * and the other will be calculated. For encryption, one digest is
|
|
+ * padded (up to a cipher blocksize) and chained with the payload
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ ctx->reqoff = ALIGN(crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth) +
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth),
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth) + 1) +
|
|
+ max(crypto_ahash_digestsize(auth),
|
|
+ crypto_skcipher_blocksize(enc));
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm,
|
|
+ sizeof(struct tls_request_ctx) +
|
|
+ ctx->reqoff +
|
|
+ max_t(unsigned int,
|
|
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
|
|
+ sizeof(struct ahash_request),
|
|
+ crypto_skcipher_reqsize(enc) +
|
|
+ sizeof(struct skcipher_request)));
|
|
+
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+
|
|
+err_free_skcipher:
|
|
+ crypto_free_skcipher(enc);
|
|
+err_free_ahash:
|
|
+ crypto_free_ahash(auth);
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static void crypto_tls_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_tls_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_free_ahash(ctx->auth);
|
|
+ crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->enc);
|
|
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static void crypto_tls_free(struct aead_instance *inst)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct tls_instance_ctx *ctx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->enc);
|
|
+ crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->auth);
|
|
+ kfree(inst);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int crypto_tls_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
|
|
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
|
|
+ struct hash_alg_common *auth;
|
|
+ struct crypto_alg *auth_base;
|
|
+ struct skcipher_alg *enc;
|
|
+ struct tls_instance_ctx *ctx;
|
|
+ const char *enc_name;
|
|
+ int err;
|
|
+
|
|
+ algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(algt))
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(algt);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if ((algt->type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) & algt->mask)
|
|
+ return -EINVAL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ auth = ahash_attr_alg(tb[1], CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH,
|
|
+ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH_MASK |
|
|
+ crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask));
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(auth))
|
|
+ return PTR_ERR(auth);
|
|
+
|
|
+ auth_base = &auth->base;
|
|
+
|
|
+ enc_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
|
|
+ err = PTR_ERR(enc_name);
|
|
+ if (IS_ERR(enc_name))
|
|
+ goto out_put_auth;
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
+ err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
+ if (!inst)
|
|
+ goto out_put_auth;
|
|
+
|
|
+ ctx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
|
|
+
|
|
+ err = crypto_init_ahash_spawn(&ctx->auth, auth,
|
|
+ aead_crypto_instance(inst));
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto err_free_inst;
|
|
+
|
|
+ crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->enc, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
|
|
+ err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ctx->enc, enc_name, 0,
|
|
+ crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
|
|
+ algt->mask));
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto err_drop_auth;
|
|
+
|
|
+ enc = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ctx->enc);
|
|
+
|
|
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
|
|
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
|
|
+ "tls10(%s,%s)", auth_base->cra_name,
|
|
+ enc->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
|
|
+ goto err_drop_enc;
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
|
|
+ "tls10(%s,%s)", auth_base->cra_driver_name,
|
|
+ enc->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
|
|
+ goto err_drop_enc;
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst->alg.base.cra_flags = (auth_base->cra_flags |
|
|
+ enc->base.cra_flags) & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
|
|
+ inst->alg.base.cra_priority = enc->base.cra_priority * 10 +
|
|
+ auth_base->cra_priority;
|
|
+ inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = enc->base.cra_blocksize;
|
|
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = auth_base->cra_alignmask |
|
|
+ enc->base.cra_alignmask;
|
|
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_tls_ctx);
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst->alg.ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(enc);
|
|
+ inst->alg.chunksize = crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(enc);
|
|
+ inst->alg.maxauthsize = auth->digestsize;
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst->alg.init = crypto_tls_init_tfm;
|
|
+ inst->alg.exit = crypto_tls_exit_tfm;
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst->alg.setkey = crypto_tls_setkey;
|
|
+ inst->alg.encrypt = crypto_tls_encrypt;
|
|
+ inst->alg.decrypt = crypto_tls_decrypt;
|
|
+
|
|
+ inst->free = crypto_tls_free;
|
|
+
|
|
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
|
|
+ if (err)
|
|
+ goto err_drop_enc;
|
|
+
|
|
+out:
|
|
+ crypto_mod_put(auth_base);
|
|
+ return err;
|
|
+
|
|
+err_drop_enc:
|
|
+ crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->enc);
|
|
+err_drop_auth:
|
|
+ crypto_drop_ahash(&ctx->auth);
|
|
+err_free_inst:
|
|
+ kfree(inst);
|
|
+out_put_auth:
|
|
+ goto out;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static struct crypto_template crypto_tls_tmpl = {
|
|
+ .name = "tls10",
|
|
+ .create = crypto_tls_create,
|
|
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
+};
|
|
+
|
|
+static int __init crypto_tls_module_init(void)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ return crypto_register_template(&crypto_tls_tmpl);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static void __exit crypto_tls_module_exit(void)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_tls_tmpl);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+module_init(crypto_tls_module_init);
|
|
+module_exit(crypto_tls_module_exit);
|
|
+
|
|
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|
|
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TLS 1.0 record encryption");
|