kernel: update kernel 3.18 to version 3.18.43
Refresh patches for all targets supporting 3.18 and not marked broken.
Compile-tested on all targets using 3.18 and not marked broken.
Changes to generic/610-netfilter_match_bypass_default_checks.patch based
on 84d489f64f.
Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>
v19.07.3_mercusys_ac12_duma
Stijn Tintel
8 years ago
parent
2fc3680dd0
commit
75e63c2494
@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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--- a/arch/mips/alchemy/board-mtx1.c
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+++ b/arch/mips/alchemy/board-mtx1.c
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@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static struct platform_device mtx1_gpio_
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static struct mtd_partition mtx1_mtd_partitions[] = {
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{
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{
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- .name = "filesystem",
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+ .name = "rootfs",
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.size = 0x01C00000,
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.offset = 0,
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},
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.size = 0x01C00000,
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.offset = 0,
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},
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@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
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--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/au1000_eth.c
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+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/amd/au1000_eth.c
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@@ -1113,10 +1113,14 @@ static void au1000_multicast_list(struct
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writel(reg, &aup->mac->control);
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writel(reg, &aup->mac->control);
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}
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+#define AU1000_KNOWN_PHY_IOCTLS (SIOCGMIIPHY & 0xfff0)
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static int au1000_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
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{
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struct au1000_private *aup = netdev_priv(dev);
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struct au1000_private *aup = netdev_priv(dev);
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+ if((cmd & AU1000_KNOWN_PHY_IOCTLS) != AU1000_KNOWN_PHY_IOCTLS)
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+ return -EINVAL;
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+
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if (!netif_running(dev))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!netif_running(dev))
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return -EINVAL;
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@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
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--- a/arch/mips/alchemy/board-mtx1.c
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+++ b/arch/mips/alchemy/board-mtx1.c
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@@ -98,6 +98,9 @@ void __init board_setup(void)
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alchemy_gpio_direction_output(211, 1); /* green on */
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alchemy_gpio_direction_output(212, 0); /* red off */
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alchemy_gpio_direction_output(211, 1); /* green on */
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alchemy_gpio_direction_output(212, 0); /* red off */
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+ /* Set watchdog pin low */
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+ alchemy_gpio_direction_output(215, 0);
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+
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pm_power_off = mtx1_power_off;
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_machine_halt = mtx1_power_off;
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_machine_restart = mtx1_reset;
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pm_power_off = mtx1_power_off;
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_machine_halt = mtx1_power_off;
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_machine_restart = mtx1_reset;
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@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
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From 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
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Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
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Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
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(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
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to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
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paper.
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This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
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some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
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sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
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Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
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Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
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to remove the host limit in the future.
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v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
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Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
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Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
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Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
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Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
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Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
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Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
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Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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---
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net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
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+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
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@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_most
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
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/* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
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-int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
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+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
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int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
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int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
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@@ -3325,12 +3325,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
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static u32 challenge_timestamp;
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static unsigned int challenge_count;
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u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
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+ u32 count;
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if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
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+ u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
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+
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challenge_timestamp = now;
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- challenge_count = 0;
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+ WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half +
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+ prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit));
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}
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- if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
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+ count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
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+ if (count > 0) {
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+ WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, count - 1);
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NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
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tcp_send_ack(sk);
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}
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