samba: fix some security problems
This fixes the following security problems: * CVE-2015-7560 * CVE-2015-5370 * CVE-2016-2110 * CVE-2016-2111 * CVE-2016-2112 * CVE-2016-2115 * CVE-2016-2118 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> SVN-Revision: 49175
Hauke Mehrtens
8 years ago
parent
894aed060e
commit
1414f1647d
@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
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From eb27f9b7bf9c1dc902d9545eecf805831bd4e46c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 11:18:12 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH 1/8] CVE-2015-7560: s3: smbd: Add refuse_symlink() function
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that can be used to prevent operations on a symlink.
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11648
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Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
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---
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source3/smbd/trans2.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
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--- a/source3/smbd/trans2.c
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+++ b/source3/smbd/trans2.c
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@@ -51,6 +51,34 @@ static char *store_file_unix_basic_info2
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files_struct *fsp,
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const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf);
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+/****************************************************************************
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+ Check if an open file handle or pathname is a symlink.
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+****************************************************************************/
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+
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+static NTSTATUS refuse_symlink(connection_struct *conn,
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+ const files_struct *fsp,
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+ const char *name)
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+{
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+ SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
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+ const SMB_STRUCT_STAT *pst = NULL;
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+
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+ if (fsp) {
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+ pst = &fsp->fsp_name->st;
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+ } else {
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+ int ret = vfs_stat_smb_fname(conn,
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+ name,
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+ &sbuf);
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+ if (ret == -1) {
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+ return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
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+ }
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+ pst = &sbuf;
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+ }
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+ if (S_ISLNK(pst->st_ex_mode)) {
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+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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+ }
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+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
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+}
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+
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/********************************************************************
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Roundup a value to the nearest allocation roundup size boundary.
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Only do this for Windows clients.
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@@ -181,12 +209,22 @@ NTSTATUS get_ea_names_from_file(TALLOC_C
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char **names, **tmp;
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size_t num_names;
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ssize_t sizeret = -1;
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+ NTSTATUS status;
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+
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+ if (pnames) {
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+ *pnames = NULL;
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+ }
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+ *pnum_names = 0;
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if (!lp_ea_support(SNUM(conn))) {
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- if (pnames) {
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- *pnames = NULL;
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- }
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- *pnum_names = 0;
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+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
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+ }
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+
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+ status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, fname);
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+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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+ /*
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+ * Just return no EA's on a symlink.
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+ */
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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@@ -236,10 +274,6 @@ NTSTATUS get_ea_names_from_file(TALLOC_C
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if (sizeret == 0) {
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TALLOC_FREE(names);
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- if (pnames) {
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- *pnames = NULL;
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- }
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- *pnum_names = 0;
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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@@ -550,6 +584,7 @@ NTSTATUS set_ea(connection_struct *conn,
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const struct smb_filename *smb_fname, struct ea_list *ea_list)
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{
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char *fname = NULL;
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+ NTSTATUS status;
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if (!lp_ea_support(SNUM(conn))) {
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return NT_STATUS_EAS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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@@ -559,6 +594,12 @@ NTSTATUS set_ea(connection_struct *conn,
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
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+ status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, smb_fname->base_name);
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+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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+ return status;
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+ }
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+
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+
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/* For now setting EAs on streams isn't supported. */
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fname = smb_fname->base_name;
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@@ -4931,6 +4972,13 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_do_qfilepathinfo(connectio
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uint16 num_file_acls = 0;
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uint16 num_def_acls = 0;
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+ status = refuse_symlink(conn,
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+ fsp,
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+ smb_fname->base_name);
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+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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+ return status;
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+ }
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+
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if (fsp && fsp->fh->fd != -1) {
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file_acl = SMB_VFS_SYS_ACL_GET_FD(fsp);
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} else {
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@@ -6452,6 +6500,7 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_posix_acl(connec
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uint16 num_def_acls;
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bool valid_file_acls = True;
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bool valid_def_acls = True;
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+ NTSTATUS status;
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if (total_data < SMB_POSIX_ACL_HEADER_SIZE) {
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return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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@@ -6479,6 +6528,11 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_posix_acl(connec
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return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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}
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+ status = refuse_symlink(conn, fsp, smb_fname->base_name);
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+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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+ return status;
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+ }
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+
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DEBUG(10,("smb_set_posix_acl: file %s num_file_acls = %u, num_def_acls = %u\n",
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smb_fname ? smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname) : fsp_str_dbg(fsp),
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(unsigned int)num_file_acls,
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--- a/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
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+++ b/source3/smbd/nttrans.c
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@@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ NTSTATUS set_sd(files_struct *fsp, struc
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return NT_STATUS_OK;
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}
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+ if (S_ISLNK(fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode)) {
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+ DEBUG(10, ("ACL set on symlink %s denied.\n",
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+ fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
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+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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+ }
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+
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if (psd->owner_sid == NULL) {
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security_info_sent &= ~SECINFO_OWNER;
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}
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@@ -1925,6 +1931,12 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_do_query_security_desc(con
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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}
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+ if (S_ISLNK(fsp->fsp_name->st.st_ex_mode)) {
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+ DEBUG(10, ("ACL get on symlink %s denied.\n",
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+ fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
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+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
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+ }
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+
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if (security_info_wanted & (SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER|
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SECINFO_GROUP|SECINFO_SACL)) {
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/* Don't return SECINFO_LABEL if anything else was
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
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From 202d69267c8550b850438877fb51c3d2c992949d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 08:46:45 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2110: s3:ntlmssp: set and use
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ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11644
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Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
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---
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source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c | 4 +++-
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
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+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
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@@ -176,17 +176,19 @@ void ntlmssp_want_feature_list(struct nt
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* also add NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL here. JRA.
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*/
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if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY", feature_list, True)) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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}
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if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN", feature_list, True)) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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}
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if(in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL", feature_list, True)) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
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}
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if (in_list("NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE", feature_list, true)) {
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ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = true;
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}
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+
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
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}
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/**
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@@ -199,17 +201,20 @@ void ntlmssp_want_feature(struct ntlmssp
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{
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/* As per JRA's comment above */
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if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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}
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if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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}
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if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
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}
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if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_CCACHE) {
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ntlmssp_state->use_ccache = true;
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}
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+
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
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}
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/**
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@@ -387,7 +392,12 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(s
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}
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if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
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- ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
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+ ntlmssp_state->required_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
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+ ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = false;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
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}
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/* generate the ntlmssp negotiate packet */
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@@ -422,6 +432,86 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_initial(s
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return NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
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}
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+static NTSTATUS ntlmssp3_handle_neg_flags(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
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+ uint32_t flags)
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+{
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+ uint32_t missing_flags = ntlmssp_state->required_flags;
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+
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+ if (flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
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+ ntlmssp_state->unicode = true;
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+ } else {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE;
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_OEM;
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+ ntlmssp_state->unicode = false;
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+ }
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+
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+ /*
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+ * NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2 (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SESSIONSECURITY)
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+ * has priority over NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY
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+ */
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LM_KEY;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_ALWAYS_SIGN;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!(flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
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+ }
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+
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+ if ((flags & NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET)) {
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+ ntlmssp_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
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+ }
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+
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+ missing_flags &= ~ntlmssp_state->neg_flags;
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+ if (missing_flags != 0) {
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+ NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_RPC_SEC_PKG_ERROR;
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+ DEBUG(1, ("%s: Got challenge flags[0x%08x] "
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+ "- possible downgrade detected! "
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+ "missing_flags[0x%08x] - %s\n",
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+ __func__,
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+ (unsigned)flags,
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+ (unsigned)missing_flags,
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+ nt_errstr(status)));
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+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(missing_flags);
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+ DEBUGADD(4, ("neg_flags[0x%08x]\n",
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+ (unsigned)ntlmssp_state->neg_flags));
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+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(ntlmssp_state->neg_flags);
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+
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+ return status;
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+ }
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+
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+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
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+}
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+
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/**
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* Next state function for the Challenge Packet. Generate an auth packet.
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*
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@@ -448,6 +538,26 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge
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DATA_BLOB encrypted_session_key = data_blob_null;
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NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
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+ if (!msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &reply, "CdBd",
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+ "NTLMSSP",
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+ &ntlmssp_command,
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+ &server_domain_blob,
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+ &chal_flags)) {
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+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
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+ dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
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+
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+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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+ }
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+ data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
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+
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+ DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
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+ debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
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+
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+ nt_status = ntlmssp3_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, chal_flags);
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+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
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+ return nt_status;
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+ }
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+
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if (ntlmssp_state->use_ccache) {
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struct wbcCredentialCacheParams params;
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struct wbcCredentialCacheInfo *info = NULL;
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@@ -498,17 +608,6 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_challenge
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noccache:
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- if (!msrpc_parse(ntlmssp_state, &reply, "CdBd",
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- "NTLMSSP",
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- &ntlmssp_command,
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- &server_domain_blob,
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- &chal_flags)) {
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- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to parse the NTLMSSP Challenge: (#1)\n"));
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- dump_data(2, reply.data, reply.length);
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-
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- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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- }
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-
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if (DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) {
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struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *challenge = talloc(
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talloc_tos(), struct CHALLENGE_MESSAGE);
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@@ -525,13 +624,6 @@ noccache:
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}
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}
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- data_blob_free(&server_domain_blob);
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-
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- DEBUG(3, ("Got challenge flags:\n"));
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- debug_ntlmssp_flags(chal_flags);
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-
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- ntlmssp_handle_neg_flags(ntlmssp_state, chal_flags, lp_client_lanman_auth());
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-
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if (ntlmssp_state->unicode) {
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if (chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO) {
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chal_parse_string = "CdUdbddB";
|
||||
@@ -769,6 +861,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_start(TALLOC_CTX
|
||||
ntlmssp_state->unicode = True;
|
||||
|
||||
ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2 = use_ntlmv2;
|
||||
+ ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = lp_client_lanman_auth();
|
||||
|
||||
ntlmssp_state->expected_state = NTLMSSP_INITIAL;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -780,6 +873,10 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_client_start(TALLOC_CTX
|
||||
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH |
|
||||
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->use_ntlmv2) {
|
||||
+ ntlmssp_state->allow_lm_key = false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name = talloc_strdup(ntlmssp_state, netbios_name);
|
||||
if (!ntlmssp_state->client.netbios_name) {
|
||||
talloc_free(ntlmssp_state);
|
||||
--- a/libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h
|
||||
+++ b/libcli/auth/ntlmssp.h
|
||||
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct ntlmssp_state
|
||||
DATA_BLOB nt_resp;
|
||||
DATA_BLOB session_key;
|
||||
|
||||
+ uint32_t required_flags;
|
||||
uint32_t neg_flags; /* the current state of negotiation with the NTLMSSP partner */
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,681 @@
|
||||
From ee105156fa151ebfd34b8febc2928e144b3b7b0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= <gd@samba.org>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 01:29:10 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 01/15] CVE-2016-2111: s3:rpc_server/netlogon: always go
|
||||
through netr_creds_server_step_check()
|
||||
|
||||
The ensures we apply the "server schannel = yes" restrictions.
|
||||
|
||||
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11749
|
||||
|
||||
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
|
||||
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
|
||||
@@ -1508,6 +1508,7 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
|
||||
case NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation:
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *wksname = nt_workstation;
|
||||
+ const char *workgroup = lp_workgroup();
|
||||
|
||||
status = make_auth_context_fixed(talloc_tos(), &auth_context,
|
||||
logon->network->challenge);
|
||||
@@ -1532,6 +1533,14 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
|
||||
logon->network->nt.length)) {
|
||||
status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||||
+ status = NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(
|
||||
+ user_info->client.account_name,
|
||||
+ user_info->client.domain_name,
|
||||
+ user_info->password.response.nt,
|
||||
+ creds, workgroup);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case NetlogonInteractiveInformation:
|
||||
@@ -1636,6 +1645,14 @@ static NTSTATUS _netr_LogonSamLogon_base
|
||||
r->out.validation->sam3);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 6:
|
||||
+ /* Only allow this if the pipe is protected. */
|
||||
+ if (p->auth.auth_level < DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(0,("netr_Validation6: client %s not using privacy for netlogon\n",
|
||||
+ get_remote_machine_name()));
|
||||
+ status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
status = serverinfo_to_SamInfo6(server_info, pipe_session_key, 16,
|
||||
r->out.validation->sam6);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -2271,11 +2288,13 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_GetForestTrustInformation
|
||||
|
||||
/* TODO: check server name */
|
||||
|
||||
- status = schannel_check_creds_state(p->mem_ctx, lp_private_dir(),
|
||||
- r->in.computer_name,
|
||||
- r->in.credential,
|
||||
- r->out.return_authenticator,
|
||||
- &creds);
|
||||
+ become_root();
|
||||
+ status = netr_creds_server_step_check(p, p->mem_ctx,
|
||||
+ r->in.computer_name,
|
||||
+ r->in.credential,
|
||||
+ r->out.return_authenticator,
|
||||
+ &creds);
|
||||
+ unbecome_root();
|
||||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2371,11 +2390,13 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerGetTrustInfo(struct
|
||||
|
||||
/* TODO: check server name */
|
||||
|
||||
- status = schannel_check_creds_state(p->mem_ctx, lp_private_dir(),
|
||||
- r->in.computer_name,
|
||||
- r->in.credential,
|
||||
- r->out.return_authenticator,
|
||||
- &creds);
|
||||
+ become_root();
|
||||
+ status = netr_creds_server_step_check(p, p->mem_ctx,
|
||||
+ r->in.computer_name,
|
||||
+ r->in.credential,
|
||||
+ r->out.return_authenticator,
|
||||
+ &creds);
|
||||
+ unbecome_root();
|
||||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c
|
||||
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samba3rpc.c
|
||||
@@ -1122,8 +1122,8 @@ static bool schan(struct torture_context
|
||||
generate_random_buffer(chal.data, chal.length);
|
||||
names_blob = NTLMv2_generate_names_blob(
|
||||
mem_ctx,
|
||||
- cli_credentials_get_workstation(user_creds),
|
||||
- cli_credentials_get_domain(user_creds));
|
||||
+ cli_credentials_get_workstation(wks_creds),
|
||||
+ cli_credentials_get_domain(wks_creds));
|
||||
status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(
|
||||
user_creds, mem_ctx, &flags, chal, names_blob,
|
||||
&lm_resp, &nt_resp, NULL, NULL);
|
||||
--- a/libcli/auth/proto.h
|
||||
+++ b/libcli/auth/proto.h
|
||||
@@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ct
|
||||
const DATA_BLOB *names_blob,
|
||||
DATA_BLOB *lm_response, DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
|
||||
DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key, DATA_BLOB *user_session_key) ;
|
||||
+NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char *account_name,
|
||||
+ const char *account_domain,
|
||||
+ const DATA_BLOB response,
|
||||
+ const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
|
||||
+ const char *workgroup);
|
||||
|
||||
/***********************************************************
|
||||
encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
|
||||
--- a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
|
||||
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
|
||||
#include "../libcli/auth/msrpc_parse.h"
|
||||
#include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
|
||||
#include "../libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
|
||||
-#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ntlmssp.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_ntlmssp.h"
|
||||
|
||||
void SMBencrypt_hash(const uint8_t lm_hash[16], const uint8_t *c8, uint8_t p24[24])
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -522,6 +522,146 @@ bool SMBNTLMv2encrypt(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ct
|
||||
lm_response, nt_response, lm_session_key, user_session_key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char *account_name,
|
||||
+ const char *account_domain,
|
||||
+ const DATA_BLOB response,
|
||||
+ const struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
|
||||
+ const char *workgroup)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = NULL;
|
||||
+ /* RespType + HiRespType */
|
||||
+ static const char *magic = "\x01\x01";
|
||||
+ int cmp;
|
||||
+ struct NTLMv2_RESPONSE v2_resp;
|
||||
+ enum ndr_err_code err;
|
||||
+ const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_cn = NULL;
|
||||
+ const struct AV_PAIR *av_nb_dn = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (response.length < 48) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * NTLMv2_RESPONSE has at least 48 bytes.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ cmp = memcmp(response.data + 16, magic, 2);
|
||||
+ if (cmp != 0) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * It doesn't look like a valid NTLMv2_RESPONSE
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&response, frame, &v2_resp,
|
||||
+ (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE);
|
||||
+ if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
|
||||
+ NTSTATUS status;
|
||||
+ status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
|
||||
+ DEBUG(2,("Failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE "
|
||||
+ "length %u - %s - %s\n",
|
||||
+ (unsigned)response.length,
|
||||
+ ndr_map_error2string(err),
|
||||
+ nt_errstr(status)));
|
||||
+ dump_data(2, response.data, response.length);
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (DEBUGLVL(10)) {
|
||||
+ NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(NTLMv2_RESPONSE, &v2_resp);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Make sure the netbios computer name in the
|
||||
+ * NTLMv2_RESPONSE matches the computer name
|
||||
+ * in the secure channel credentials for workstation
|
||||
+ * trusts.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * And the netbios domain name matches our
|
||||
+ * workgroup.
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * This prevents workstations from requesting
|
||||
+ * the session key of NTLMSSP sessions of clients
|
||||
+ * to other hosts.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (creds->secure_channel_type == SEC_CHAN_WKSTA) {
|
||||
+ av_nb_cn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
|
||||
+ MsvAvNbComputerName);
|
||||
+ av_nb_dn = ndr_ntlmssp_find_av(&v2_resp.Challenge.AvPairs,
|
||||
+ MsvAvNbDomainName);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (av_nb_cn != NULL) {
|
||||
+ const char *v = NULL;
|
||||
+ char *a = NULL;
|
||||
+ size_t len;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ v = av_nb_cn->Value.AvNbComputerName;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ a = talloc_strdup(frame, creds->account_name);
|
||||
+ if (a == NULL) {
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ len = strlen(a);
|
||||
+ if (len > 0 && a[len - 1] == '$') {
|
||||
+ a[len - 1] = '\0';
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL /* smbtorture4 for make test */
|
||||
+ cmp = strcasecmp_m(a, v);
|
||||
+#else /* smbd */
|
||||
+ cmp = StrCaseCmp(a, v);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ if (cmp != 0) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
|
||||
+ "NbComputerName[%s] rejected "
|
||||
+ "for user[%s\\%s] "
|
||||
+ "against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
|
||||
+ "in workgroup[%s]\n",
|
||||
+ __func__, v,
|
||||
+ account_domain,
|
||||
+ account_name,
|
||||
+ creds->computer_name,
|
||||
+ creds->account_name,
|
||||
+ workgroup));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (av_nb_dn != NULL) {
|
||||
+ const char *v = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ v = av_nb_dn->Value.AvNbDomainName;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#ifdef SAMBA4_INTERNAL_HEIMDAL /* smbtorture4 for make test */
|
||||
+ cmp = strcasecmp_m(workgroup, v);
|
||||
+#else /* smbd */
|
||||
+ cmp = StrCaseCmp(workgroup, v);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ if (cmp != 0) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(2,("%s: NTLMv2_RESPONSE with "
|
||||
+ "NbDomainName[%s] rejected "
|
||||
+ "for user[%s\\%s] "
|
||||
+ "against SEC_CHAN_WKSTA[%s/%s] "
|
||||
+ "in workgroup[%s]\n",
|
||||
+ __func__, v,
|
||||
+ account_domain,
|
||||
+ account_name,
|
||||
+ creds->computer_name,
|
||||
+ creds->account_name,
|
||||
+ workgroup));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/***********************************************************
|
||||
encode a password buffer with a unicode password. The buffer
|
||||
is filled with random data to make it harder to attack.
|
||||
--- a/libcli/auth/wscript_build
|
||||
+++ b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('MSRPC_PARSE',
|
||||
|
||||
bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('LIBCLI_AUTH',
|
||||
source='credentials.c session.c smbencrypt.c smbdes.c',
|
||||
- public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE',
|
||||
+ public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE NDR_NTLMSSP',
|
||||
public_headers='credentials.h:domain_credentials.h'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/Makefile.in
|
||||
+++ b/source3/Makefile.in
|
||||
@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ GROUPDB_OBJ = groupdb/mapping.o groupdb/
|
||||
PROFILE_OBJ = profile/profile.o
|
||||
PROFILES_OBJ = utils/profiles.o \
|
||||
$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIB_OBJ) $(LIB_DUMMY_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
|
||||
@@ -995,10 +996,10 @@ SWAT_OBJ = $(SWAT_OBJ1) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(P
|
||||
STATUS_OBJ = utils/status.o utils/status_profile.o \
|
||||
$(LOCKING_OBJ) $(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(PROFILE_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
SMBCONTROL_OBJ = utils/smbcontrol.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(PRINTBASE_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(PRINTBASE_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
SMBTREE_OBJ = utils/smbtree.o $(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(PROFILE_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_OBJ) \
|
||||
@@ -1012,11 +1013,11 @@ SMBTREE_OBJ = utils/smbtree.o $(PARAM_OB
|
||||
|
||||
TESTPARM_OBJ = utils/testparm.o \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
SMBTA_UTIL_OBJ = utils/smbta-util.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(FNAME_UTIL_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_LP_LOAD_OBJ = param/test_lp_load.o \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
@@ -1146,6 +1147,7 @@ SMBCONFTORT_OBJ = $(SMBCONFTORT_OBJ0) \
|
||||
$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
PTHREADPOOLTEST_OBJ = lib/pthreadpool/pthreadpool.o \
|
||||
@@ -1229,7 +1231,7 @@ CUPS_OBJ = client/smbspool.o $(PARAM_OBJ
|
||||
$(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
|
||||
|
||||
NMBLOOKUP_OBJ = utils/nmblookup.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
SMBTORTURE_OBJ1 = torture/torture.o torture/nbio.o torture/scanner.o torture/utable.o \
|
||||
torture/denytest.o torture/mangle_test.o \
|
||||
@@ -1253,6 +1255,7 @@ MASKTEST_OBJ = torture/masktest.o $(PARA
|
||||
$(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
|
||||
|
||||
MSGTEST_OBJ = torture/msgtest.o $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1269,7 +1272,7 @@ PDBTEST_OBJ = torture/pdbtest.o $(PARAM_
|
||||
|
||||
VFSTEST_OBJ = torture/cmd_vfs.o torture/vfstest.o $(SMBD_OBJ_BASE) $(READLINE_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
-SMBICONV_OBJ = $(PARAM_OBJ) torture/smbiconv.o $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
|
||||
+SMBICONV_OBJ = $(PARAM_OBJ) torture/smbiconv.o $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(POPT_LIB_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
LOG2PCAP_OBJ = utils/log2pcaphex.o
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1297,17 +1300,17 @@ SMBCQUOTAS_OBJ = utils/smbcquotas.o $(LI
|
||||
EVTLOGADM_OBJ0 = utils/eventlogadm.o
|
||||
|
||||
EVTLOGADM_OBJ = $(EVTLOGADM_OBJ0) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIB_EVENTLOG_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(LIB_EVENTLOG_OBJ) \
|
||||
librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_eventlog.o \
|
||||
librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.o
|
||||
|
||||
SHARESEC_OBJ0 = utils/sharesec.o
|
||||
SHARESEC_OBJ = $(SHARESEC_OBJ0) $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
TALLOCTORT_OBJ = @tallocdir@/testsuite.o @tallocdir@/testsuite_main.o \
|
||||
- $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(PARAM_OBJ) $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
REPLACETORT_OBJ = @libreplacedir@/test/testsuite.o \
|
||||
@libreplacedir@/test/getifaddrs.o \
|
||||
@@ -1323,7 +1326,7 @@ SMBFILTER_OBJ = utils/smbfilter.o $(PARA
|
||||
$(LIBNDR_GEN_OBJ0)
|
||||
|
||||
WINBIND_WINS_NSS_OBJ = ../nsswitch/wins.o $(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) $(LIBNMB_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
PAM_SMBPASS_OBJ_0 = pam_smbpass/pam_smb_auth.o pam_smbpass/pam_smb_passwd.o \
|
||||
pam_smbpass/pam_smb_acct.o pam_smbpass/support.o ../lib/util/asn1.o
|
||||
@@ -1531,12 +1534,14 @@ RPC_OPEN_TCP_OBJ = torture/rpc_open_tcp.
|
||||
DBWRAP_TOOL_OBJ = utils/dbwrap_tool.o \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
- $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ)
|
||||
+ $(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
DBWRAP_TORTURE_OBJ = utils/dbwrap_torture.o \
|
||||
$(PARAM_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIB_NONSMBD_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(LIBSMB_ERR_OBJ) \
|
||||
+ $(LIBNDR_NTLMSSP_OBJ) \
|
||||
$(POPT_LIB_OBJ)
|
||||
|
||||
SPLIT_TOKENS_OBJ = utils/split_tokens.o \
|
||||
--- a/source4/torture/raw/samba3misc.c
|
||||
+++ b/source4/torture/raw/samba3misc.c
|
||||
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
|
||||
bool ret = true;
|
||||
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
|
||||
bool nt_status_support;
|
||||
+ bool client_ntlmv2_auth;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(mem_ctx = talloc_init("torture_samba3_badpath"))) {
|
||||
d_printf("talloc_init failed\n");
|
||||
@@ -347,20 +348,17 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
nt_status_support = lpcfg_nt_status_support(torture->lp_ctx);
|
||||
+ client_ntlmv2_auth = lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(torture->lp_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes")) {
|
||||
- printf("Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
|
||||
- goto fail;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "yes"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_nt, torture, 0)) {
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no")) {
|
||||
- printf("Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
|
||||
- goto fail;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support = no'\n");
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "no"), ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = no'\n");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_dos, torture, 1)) {
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
@@ -373,6 +371,12 @@ bool torture_samba3_badpath(struct tortu
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
smbcli_deltree(cli_nt->tree, dirname);
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "nt status support",
|
||||
+ nt_status_support ? "yes":"no"),
|
||||
+ ret, fail, "Could not set 'nt status support' back to where it was\n");
|
||||
+ torture_assert_goto(torture, lpcfg_set_cmdline(torture->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth",
|
||||
+ client_ntlmv2_auth ? "yes":"no"),
|
||||
+ ret, fail, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth' back to where it was\n");
|
||||
|
||||
status = smbcli_mkdir(cli_nt->tree, dirname);
|
||||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||||
--- a/source4/torture/basic/base.c
|
||||
+++ b/source4/torture/basic/base.c
|
||||
@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ static bool torture_chkpath_test(struct
|
||||
static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(struct torture_context *tctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
bool nt_status_support;
|
||||
+ bool client_ntlmv2_auth;
|
||||
struct smbcli_state *cli_nt = NULL, *cli_dos = NULL;
|
||||
bool result = false;
|
||||
int fnum;
|
||||
@@ -1485,18 +1486,27 @@ static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(st
|
||||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||||
|
||||
nt_status_support = lpcfg_nt_status_support(tctx->lp_ctx);
|
||||
+ client_ntlmv2_auth = lpcfg_client_ntlmv2_auth(tctx->lp_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "yes")) {
|
||||
torture_comment(tctx, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "yes")) {
|
||||
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
if (!torture_open_connection(&cli_nt, tctx, 0)) {
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support", "no")) {
|
||||
- torture_comment(tctx, "Could not set 'nt status support = yes'\n");
|
||||
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'nt status support = no'\n");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth", "no")) {
|
||||
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not set 'client ntlmv2 auth = no'\n");
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1506,7 +1516,12 @@ static bool torture_samba3_errorpaths(st
|
||||
|
||||
if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "nt status support",
|
||||
nt_status_support ? "yes":"no")) {
|
||||
- torture_comment(tctx, "Could not reset 'nt status support = yes'");
|
||||
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not reset 'nt status support'");
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!lpcfg_set_cmdline(tctx->lp_ctx, "client ntlmv2 auth",
|
||||
+ client_ntlmv2_auth ? "yes":"no")) {
|
||||
+ torture_result(tctx, TORTURE_FAIL, "Could not reset 'client ntlmv2 auth'");
|
||||
goto fail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/libsmb/cliconnect.c
|
||||
@@ -2077,6 +2077,17 @@ NTSTATUS cli_session_setup(struct cli_st
|
||||
NTSTATUS status;
|
||||
|
||||
/* otherwise do a NT1 style session setup */
|
||||
+ if (lp_client_ntlmv2_auth() && lp_client_use_spnego()) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * Don't send an NTLMv2 response without NTLMSSP
|
||||
+ * if we want to use spnego support
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ DEBUG(1, ("Server does not support EXTENDED_SECURITY "
|
||||
+ " but 'client use spnego = yes"
|
||||
+ " and 'client ntlmv2 auth = yes'\n"));
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
status = cli_session_setup_nt1(cli, user, pass, passlen,
|
||||
ntpass, ntpasslen, workgroup);
|
||||
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
|
||||
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientusespnego.xml
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/clientusespnego.xml
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
|
||||
supporting servers (including WindowsXP, Windows2000 and Samba
|
||||
3.0) to agree upon an authentication
|
||||
mechanism. This enables Kerberos authentication in particular.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>When <smbconfoption name="client NTLMv2 auth"/> is also set to
|
||||
+ <constant>yes</constant> extended security (SPNEGO) is required
|
||||
+ in order to use NTLMv2 only within NTLMSSP. This behavior was
|
||||
+ introduced with the patches for CVE-2016-2111.</para>
|
||||
</description>
|
||||
|
||||
<value type="default">yes</value>
|
||||
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientntlmv2auth.xml
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientntlmv2auth.xml
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
|
||||
NTLMv2 by default, and some sites (particularly those following
|
||||
'best practice' security polices) only allow NTLMv2 responses, and
|
||||
not the weaker LM or NTLM.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>When <smbconfoption name="client use spnego"/> is also set to
|
||||
+ <constant>yes</constant> extended security (SPNEGO) is required
|
||||
+ in order to use NTLMv2 only within NTLMSSP. This behavior was
|
||||
+ introduced with the patches for CVE-2016-2111.</para>
|
||||
</description>
|
||||
<value type="default">yes</value>
|
||||
</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/rawntlmv2auth.xml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
||||
+<samba:parameter name="raw NTLMv2 auth"
|
||||
+ context="G"
|
||||
+ type="boolean"
|
||||
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
|
||||
+<description>
|
||||
+ <para>This parameter determines whether or not <citerefentry><refentrytitle>smbd</refentrytitle>
|
||||
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> will allow SMB1 clients without
|
||||
+ extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>If this option, <command moreinfo="none">lanman auth</command>
|
||||
+ and <command moreinfo="none">ntlm auth</command> are all disabled,
|
||||
+ then only clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted.
|
||||
+ That means NTLMv2 is only supported within NTLMSSP.</para>
|
||||
+</description>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+<related>lanman auth</related>
|
||||
+<related>ntlm auth</related>
|
||||
+<value type="default">no</value>
|
||||
+</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
@@ -1489,6 +1489,7 @@ bool lp_map_untrusted_to_domain(void);
|
||||
int lp_restrict_anonymous(void);
|
||||
bool lp_lanman_auth(void);
|
||||
bool lp_ntlm_auth(void);
|
||||
+bool lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth(void);
|
||||
bool lp_client_plaintext_auth(void);
|
||||
bool lp_client_lanman_auth(void);
|
||||
bool lp_client_ntlmv2_auth(void);
|
||||
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ struct global {
|
||||
bool bAllowTrustedDomains;
|
||||
bool bLanmanAuth;
|
||||
bool bNTLMAuth;
|
||||
+ bool bRawNTLMv2Auth;
|
||||
bool bUseSpnego;
|
||||
bool bClientLanManAuth;
|
||||
bool bClientNTLMv2Auth;
|
||||
@@ -1383,6 +1384,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
|
||||
.flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ .label = "raw NTLMv2 auth",
|
||||
+ .type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
+ .p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
+ .ptr = &Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth,
|
||||
+ .special = NULL,
|
||||
+ .enum_list = NULL,
|
||||
+ .flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
.label = "client NTLMv2 auth",
|
||||
.type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
.p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
@@ -5337,6 +5347,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
|
||||
Globals.bClientPlaintextAuth = False; /* Do NOT use a plaintext password even if is requested by the server */
|
||||
Globals.bLanmanAuth = False; /* Do NOT use the LanMan hash, even if it is supplied */
|
||||
Globals.bNTLMAuth = True; /* Do use NTLMv1 if it is supplied by the client (otherwise NTLMv2) */
|
||||
+ Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth = false; /* Allow NTLMv2 without NTLMSSP */
|
||||
Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
|
||||
/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5819,6 +5830,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_map_untrusted_to_domai
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_restrict_anonymous, &Globals.restrict_anonymous)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_lanman_auth, &Globals.bLanmanAuth)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_ntlm_auth, &Globals.bNTLMAuth)
|
||||
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth, &Globals.bRawNTLMv2Auth)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_plaintext_auth, &Globals.bClientPlaintextAuth)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_lanman_auth, &Globals.bClientLanManAuth)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_client_ntlmv2_auth, &Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth)
|
||||
--- a/source3/auth/auth_util.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/auth/auth_util.c
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
|
||||
#include "../lib/util/util_pw.h"
|
||||
#include "lib/winbind_util.h"
|
||||
#include "passdb.h"
|
||||
+#include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#undef DBGC_CLASS
|
||||
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_AUTH
|
||||
@@ -367,6 +368,19 @@ NTSTATUS make_user_info_for_reply_enc(st
|
||||
const char *client_domain,
|
||||
DATA_BLOB lm_resp, DATA_BLOB nt_resp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ bool allow_raw = lp_raw_ntlmv2_auth();
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!allow_raw && nt_resp.length >= 48) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * NTLMv2_RESPONSE has at least 48 bytes
|
||||
+ * and should only be supported via NTLMSSP.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ DEBUG(2,("Rejecting raw NTLMv2 authentication with "
|
||||
+ "user [%s\\%s]\n",
|
||||
+ client_domain, smb_name));
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return make_user_info_map(user_info, smb_name,
|
||||
client_domain,
|
||||
get_remote_machine_name(),
|
||||
--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
|
||||
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
|
||||
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ sub setup_dc($$)
|
||||
domain master = yes
|
||||
domain logons = yes
|
||||
lanman auth = yes
|
||||
+ raw NTLMv2 auth = yes
|
||||
";
|
||||
|
||||
my $vars = $self->provision($path,
|
||||
@@ -230,6 +231,7 @@ sub setup_secserver($$$)
|
||||
my $secserver_options = "
|
||||
security = server
|
||||
password server = $s3dcvars->{SERVER_IP}
|
||||
+ client ntlmv2 auth = no
|
||||
";
|
||||
|
||||
my $ret = $self->provision($prefix,
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
|
||||
From 126e3e992bed7174d60ee19212db9b717647ab2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2016 16:55:44 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2016-2112: s3:ntlmssp: Implement missing
|
||||
ntlmssp_have_feature()
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
source3/include/proto.h | 1 +
|
||||
source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
@@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_password(struct ntl
|
||||
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_domain(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, const char *domain) ;
|
||||
void ntlmssp_want_feature_list(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, char *feature_list);
|
||||
void ntlmssp_want_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, uint32_t feature);
|
||||
+bool ntlmssp_have_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state, uint32_t feature);
|
||||
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_update(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
|
||||
const DATA_BLOB in, DATA_BLOB *out) ;
|
||||
NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_start(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
|
||||
--- a/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/libsmb/ntlmssp.c
|
||||
@@ -162,6 +162,36 @@ NTSTATUS ntlmssp_set_domain(struct ntlms
|
||||
return NT_STATUS_OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+bool ntlmssp_have_feature(struct ntlmssp_state *ntlmssp_state,
|
||||
+ uint32_t feature)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN) {
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length == 0) {
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) {
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL) {
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length == 0) {
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->neg_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) {
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (feature & NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY) {
|
||||
+ if (ntlmssp_state->session_key.length > 0) {
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Request features for the NTLMSSP negotiation
|
||||
*
|
||||
--- a/source3/libads/sasl.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/libads/sasl.c
|
||||
@@ -261,6 +261,37 @@ static ADS_STATUS ads_sasl_spnego_ntlmss
|
||||
/* we have a reference conter on ntlmssp_state, if we are signing
|
||||
then the state will be kept by the signing engine */
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (ads->ldap.wrap_type >= ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SEAL) {
|
||||
+ bool ok;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
|
||||
+ NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SEAL);
|
||||
+ if (!ok) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(0,("The ntlmssp feature sealing request, but unavailable\n"));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
|
||||
+ return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
|
||||
+ NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN);
|
||||
+ if (!ok) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(0,("The ntlmssp feature signing request, but unavailable\n"));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
|
||||
+ return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ } else if (ads->ldap.wrap_type >= ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_SIGN) {
|
||||
+ bool ok;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ok = ntlmssp_have_feature(ntlmssp_state,
|
||||
+ NTLMSSP_FEATURE_SIGN);
|
||||
+ if (!ok) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(0,("The gensec feature signing request, but unavailable\n"));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(ntlmssp_state);
|
||||
+ return ADS_ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (ads->ldap.wrap_type > ADS_SASLWRAP_TYPE_PLAIN) {
|
||||
ads->ldap.out.max_unwrapped = ADS_SASL_WRAPPING_OUT_MAX_WRAPPED - NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
|
||||
ads->ldap.out.sig_size = NTLMSSP_SIG_SIZE;
|
||||
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/ldap/clientldapsaslwrapping.xml
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/ldap/clientldapsaslwrapping.xml
|
||||
@@ -34,11 +34,9 @@
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
|
||||
<para>
|
||||
- The default value is <emphasis>plain</emphasis> which is not irritable
|
||||
- to KRB5 clock skew errors. That implies synchronizing the time
|
||||
- with the KDC in the case of using <emphasis>sign</emphasis> or
|
||||
- <emphasis>seal</emphasis>.
|
||||
+ The default value is <emphasis>sign</emphasis>. That implies synchronizing the time
|
||||
+ with the KDC in the case of using <emphasis>Kerberos</emphasis>.
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</description>
|
||||
-<value type="default">plain</value>
|
||||
+<value type="default">sign</value>
|
||||
</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
@@ -5392,6 +5392,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
|
||||
Globals.ldap_debug_level = 0;
|
||||
Globals.ldap_debug_threshold = 10;
|
||||
|
||||
+ Globals.client_ldap_sasl_wrapping = ADS_AUTH_SASL_SIGN;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* This is what we tell the afs client. in reality we set the token
|
||||
* to never expire, though, when this runs out the afs client will
|
||||
* forget the token. Set to 0 to get NEVERDATE.*/
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
|
||||
From 513bd34e4523e49e742487be32a7239111486a12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2016 03:43:58 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] CVE-2016-2115: docs-xml: add "client ipc signing" option
|
||||
|
||||
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11756
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml | 3 +++
|
||||
source3/include/proto.h | 1 +
|
||||
source3/param/loadparm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
||||
4 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
|
||||
create mode 100644 docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml
|
||||
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientipcsigning.xml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
+<samba:parameter name="client ipc signing"
|
||||
+ context="G"
|
||||
+ type="enum"
|
||||
+ enumlist="enum_smb_signing_vals"
|
||||
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
|
||||
+<description>
|
||||
+ <para>This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use SMB signing for IPC$
|
||||
+ connections as DCERPC transport inside of winbind. Possible values
|
||||
+ are <emphasis>auto</emphasis>, <emphasis>mandatory</emphasis>
|
||||
+ and <emphasis>disabled</emphasis>.
|
||||
+ </para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and if set
|
||||
+ to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
|
||||
+ always enforce signing.</para>
|
||||
+</description>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+<related>client signing</related>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+<value type="default">mandatory</value>
|
||||
+</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/clientsigning.xml
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
|
||||
<para>When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced.
|
||||
When set to mandatory, SMB signing is required and if set
|
||||
to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>IPC$ connections for DCERPC e.g. in winbindd, are handled by the
|
||||
+ <smbconfoption name="client ipc signing"/> option.</para>
|
||||
</para>
|
||||
</description>
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
@@ -1690,9 +1690,11 @@ int lp_winbind_cache_time(void);
|
||||
int lp_winbind_reconnect_delay(void);
|
||||
int lp_winbind_max_clients(void);
|
||||
const char **lp_winbind_nss_info(void);
|
||||
+bool lp_winbind_sealed_pipes(void);
|
||||
int lp_algorithmic_rid_base(void);
|
||||
int lp_name_cache_timeout(void);
|
||||
int lp_client_signing(void);
|
||||
+int lp_client_ipc_signing(void);
|
||||
int lp_server_signing(void);
|
||||
int lp_client_ldap_sasl_wrapping(void);
|
||||
char *lp_parm_talloc_string(int snum, const char *type, const char *option, const char *def);
|
||||
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct global {
|
||||
int winbind_expand_groups;
|
||||
bool bWinbindRefreshTickets;
|
||||
bool bWinbindOfflineLogon;
|
||||
+ bool bWinbindSealedPipes;
|
||||
bool bWinbindNormalizeNames;
|
||||
bool bWinbindRpcOnly;
|
||||
bool bCreateKrb5Conf;
|
||||
@@ -366,6 +367,7 @@ struct global {
|
||||
int restrict_anonymous;
|
||||
int name_cache_timeout;
|
||||
int client_signing;
|
||||
+ int client_ipc_signing;
|
||||
int server_signing;
|
||||
int client_ldap_sasl_wrapping;
|
||||
int iUsershareMaxShares;
|
||||
@@ -2319,6 +2321,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
|
||||
.flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ .label = "client ipc signing",
|
||||
+ .type = P_ENUM,
|
||||
+ .p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
+ .ptr = &Globals.client_ipc_signing,
|
||||
+ .special = NULL,
|
||||
+ .enum_list = enum_smb_signing_vals,
|
||||
+ .flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
.label = "server signing",
|
||||
.type = P_ENUM,
|
||||
.p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
@@ -4765,6 +4776,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
|
||||
.flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ .label = "winbind sealed pipes",
|
||||
+ .type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
+ .p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
+ .ptr = &Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes,
|
||||
+ .special = NULL,
|
||||
+ .enum_list = NULL,
|
||||
+ .flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
.label = "winbind normalize names",
|
||||
.type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
.p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
@@ -5458,6 +5478,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
|
||||
Globals.szWinbindNssInfo = str_list_make_v3(NULL, "template", NULL);
|
||||
Globals.bWinbindRefreshTickets = False;
|
||||
Globals.bWinbindOfflineLogon = False;
|
||||
+ Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes = True;
|
||||
|
||||
Globals.iIdmapCacheTime = 86400 * 7; /* a week by default */
|
||||
Globals.iIdmapNegativeCacheTime = 120; /* 2 minutes by default */
|
||||
@@ -5470,6 +5491,7 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
|
||||
Globals.bClientUseSpnego = True;
|
||||
|
||||
Globals.client_signing = Auto;
|
||||
+ Globals.client_ipc_signing = Required;
|
||||
Globals.server_signing = False;
|
||||
|
||||
Globals.bDeferSharingViolations = True;
|
||||
@@ -5736,6 +5758,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_nested_groups,
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_winbind_expand_groups, &Globals.winbind_expand_groups)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_refresh_tickets, &Globals.bWinbindRefreshTickets)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_offline_logon, &Globals.bWinbindOfflineLogon)
|
||||
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_sealed_pipes, &Globals.bWinbindSealedPipes)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_normalize_names, &Globals.bWinbindNormalizeNames)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_winbind_rpc_only, &Globals.bWinbindRpcOnly)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_create_krb5_conf, &Globals.bCreateKrb5Conf)
|
||||
@@ -6071,6 +6094,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_LIST(lp_winbind_nss_info, &Glo
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_algorithmic_rid_base, &Globals.AlgorithmicRidBase)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_name_cache_timeout, &Globals.name_cache_timeout)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_signing, &Globals.client_signing)
|
||||
+FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_ipc_signing, &Globals.client_ipc_signing)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_server_signing, &Globals.server_signing)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_client_ldap_sasl_wrapping, &Globals.client_ldap_sasl_wrapping)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9700,6 +9724,20 @@ static bool lp_load_ex(const char *pszFn
|
||||
lp_do_parameter(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM, "wins server", "127.0.0.1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (!lp_is_in_client()) {
|
||||
+ switch (lp_client_ipc_signing()) {
|
||||
+ case Required:
|
||||
+ lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "mandatory");
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case Auto:
|
||||
+ lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "auto");
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ case False:
|
||||
+ lp_set_cmdline("client signing", "disabled");
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
init_iconv();
|
||||
|
||||
bAllowIncludeRegistry = true;
|
||||
--- a/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/spoolss/srv_spoolss_nt.c
|
||||
@@ -2480,7 +2480,7 @@ static bool spoolss_connect_to_client(st
|
||||
"", /* username */
|
||||
"", /* domain */
|
||||
"", /* password */
|
||||
- 0, lp_client_signing());
|
||||
+ 0, False);
|
||||
|
||||
if ( !NT_STATUS_IS_OK( ret ) ) {
|
||||
DEBUG(2,("spoolss_connect_to_client: connection to [%s] failed!\n",
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/winbind/winbindsealedpipes.xml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
+<samba:parameter name="winbind sealed pipes"
|
||||
+ context="G"
|
||||
+ type="boolean"
|
||||
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
|
||||
+<description>
|
||||
+ <para>This option controls whether any requests from winbindd to domain controllers
|
||||
+ pipe will be sealed. Disabling sealing can be useful for debugging
|
||||
+ purposes.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>The behavior can be controlled per netbios domain
|
||||
+ by using 'winbind sealed pipes:NETBIOSDOMAIN = no' as option.</para>
|
||||
+</description>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+<value type="default">yes</value>
|
||||
+</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- a/source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/winbindd/winbindd_cm.c
|
||||
@@ -2384,6 +2384,15 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_sam(struct winbindd_
|
||||
TALLOC_FREE(conn->samr_pipe);
|
||||
|
||||
anonymous:
|
||||
+ if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
|
||||
+ status = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
|
||||
+ DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make SAMR connection to domain %s "
|
||||
+ "without connection level security, "
|
||||
+ "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
|
||||
+ "to proceed: %s\n",
|
||||
+ domain->name, nt_errstr(status)));
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
/* Finally fall back to anonymous. */
|
||||
status = cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth(conn->cli, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id,
|
||||
@@ -2610,6 +2619,16 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_lsa(struct winbindd_
|
||||
|
||||
anonymous:
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
|
||||
+ result = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
|
||||
+ DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make LSA connection to domain %s "
|
||||
+ "without connection level security, "
|
||||
+ "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
|
||||
+ "to proceed: %s\n",
|
||||
+ domain->name, nt_errstr(result)));
|
||||
+ goto done;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
result = cli_rpc_pipe_open_noauth(conn->cli,
|
||||
&ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id,
|
||||
&conn->lsa_pipe);
|
||||
@@ -2749,7 +2768,18 @@ NTSTATUS cm_connect_netlogon(struct winb
|
||||
|
||||
no_schannel:
|
||||
if ((lp_client_schannel() == False) ||
|
||||
- ((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) {
|
||||
+ ((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) {
|
||||
+ if (lp_winbind_sealed_pipes() && (IS_DC || domain->primary)) {
|
||||
+ result = NT_STATUS_DOWNGRADE_DETECTED;
|
||||
+ DEBUG(1, ("Unwilling to make connection to domain %s "
|
||||
+ "without connection level security, "
|
||||
+ "must set 'winbind sealed pipes = false' "
|
||||
+ "to proceed: %s\n",
|
||||
+ domain->name, nt_errstr(result)));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(netlogon_pipe);
|
||||
+ invalidate_cm_connection(conn);
|
||||
+ return result;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* NetSamLogonEx only works for schannel
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
|
||||
From d68424b5ef92f5810760f90e9eeb664572a61e4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:49:36 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 01/10] CVE-2016-2118: s3: rpcclient: change the default auth
|
||||
level from DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY
|
||||
|
||||
ncacn_ip_tcp:server should get the same protection as ncacn_np:server
|
||||
if authentication and smb signing is used.
|
||||
|
||||
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit dab41dee8a4fb27dbf3913b0e44a4cc726e3ac98)
|
||||
---
|
||||
source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c | 5 ++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/rpcclient/rpcclient.c
|
||||
@@ -1062,10 +1062,9 @@ out_free:
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (pipe_default_auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE) {
|
||||
- /* If neither Integrity or Privacy are requested then
|
||||
- * Use just Connect level */
|
||||
+ /* If nothing is requested then default to integrity */
|
||||
if (pipe_default_auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE) {
|
||||
- pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT;
|
||||
+ pipe_default_auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
|
||||
+++ b/source4/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_util.c
|
||||
@@ -593,15 +593,15 @@ struct composite_context *dcerpc_pipe_au
|
||||
|
||||
/* Perform an authenticated DCE-RPC bind
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_SIGN|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
|
||||
+ if (!(conn->flags & (DCERPC_CONNECT|DCERPC_SEAL))) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
we are doing an authenticated connection,
|
||||
- but not using sign or seal. We must force
|
||||
- the CONNECT dcerpc auth type as a NONE auth
|
||||
- type doesn't allow authentication
|
||||
- information to be passed.
|
||||
+ which needs to use [connect], [sign] or [seal].
|
||||
+ If nothing is specified, we default to [sign] now.
|
||||
+ This give roughly the same protection as
|
||||
+ ncacn_np with smb signing.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- conn->flags |= DCERPC_CONNECT;
|
||||
+ conn->flags |= DCERPC_SIGN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (s->binding->flags & DCERPC_AUTH_SPNEGO) {
|
||||
--- /dev/null
|
||||
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/allowdcerpcauthlevelconnect.xml
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
+<samba:parameter name="allow dcerpc auth level connect"
|
||||
+ context="G"
|
||||
+ type="boolean"
|
||||
+ xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
|
||||
+<description>
|
||||
+ <para>This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to
|
||||
+ be used with DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication,
|
||||
+ but no per message integrity nor privacy protection.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>The behavior can be controlled per interface name (e.g. lsarpc, netlogon, samr, srvsvc,
|
||||
+ winreg, wkssvc ...) by using 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = no' as option.</para>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ <para>This option yields precedence to the implentation specific restrictions.
|
||||
+ E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
|
||||
+ While others like samr and lsarpc have a hardcoded default of <constant>no</constant>.
|
||||
+ </para>
|
||||
+</description>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+<value type="default">no</value>
|
||||
+<value type="example">yes</value>
|
||||
+
|
||||
+</samba:parameter>
|
||||
--- a/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
+++ b/source3/include/proto.h
|
||||
@@ -1821,6 +1821,7 @@ char* lp_perfcount_module(void);
|
||||
void lp_set_passdb_backend(const char *backend);
|
||||
void widelinks_warning(int snum);
|
||||
char *lp_ncalrpc_dir(void);
|
||||
+bool lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/* The following definitions come from param/loadparm_server_role.c */
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
|
||||
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ struct global {
|
||||
bool bUseMmap;
|
||||
bool bHostnameLookups;
|
||||
bool bUnixExtensions;
|
||||
+ bool bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect;
|
||||
bool bDisableNetbios;
|
||||
char * szDedicatedKeytabFile;
|
||||
int iKerberosMethod;
|
||||
@@ -2303,6 +2304,15 @@ static struct parm_struct parm_table[] =
|
||||
.flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ .label = "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
|
||||
+ .type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
+ .p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
+ .ptr = &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect,
|
||||
+ .special = NULL,
|
||||
+ .enum_list = NULL,
|
||||
+ .flags = FLAG_ADVANCED,
|
||||
+ },
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
.label = "use spnego",
|
||||
.type = P_BOOL,
|
||||
.p_class = P_GLOBAL,
|
||||
@@ -5371,6 +5381,8 @@ static void init_globals(bool reinit_glo
|
||||
Globals.bClientNTLMv2Auth = True; /* Client should always use use NTLMv2, as we can't tell that the server supports it, but most modern servers do */
|
||||
/* Note, that we will also use NTLM2 session security (which is different), if it is available */
|
||||
|
||||
+ Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect = false; /* we don't allow this by default */
|
||||
+
|
||||
Globals.map_to_guest = 0; /* By Default, "Never" */
|
||||
Globals.oplock_break_wait_time = 0; /* By Default, 0 msecs. */
|
||||
Globals.enhanced_browsing = true;
|
||||
@@ -5745,6 +5757,7 @@ FN_GLOBAL_INTEGER(lp_username_map_cache_
|
||||
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_check_password_script, &Globals.szCheckPasswordScript)
|
||||
|
||||
+FN_GLOBAL_BOOL(lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect, &Globals.bAllowDcerpcAuthLevelConnect)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_STRING(lp_wins_hook, &Globals.szWINSHook)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_homedir, &Globals.szTemplateHomedir)
|
||||
FN_GLOBAL_CONST_STRING(lp_template_shell, &Globals.szTemplateShell)
|
||||
--- a/source3/include/ntdomain.h
|
||||
+++ b/source3/include/ntdomain.h
|
||||
@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ typedef struct pipe_rpc_fns {
|
||||
uint32 context_id;
|
||||
struct ndr_syntax_id syntax;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * shall we allow "connect" auth level for this interface ?
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ bool allow_connect;
|
||||
} PIPE_RPC_FNS;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
--- a/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@
|
||||
#include "rpc_server/srv_pipe.h"
|
||||
#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
|
||||
#include "../librpc/ndr/ndr_dcerpc.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_samr.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_lsa.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_epmapper.h"
|
||||
+#include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_echo.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#undef DBGC_CLASS
|
||||
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV
|
||||
@@ -340,6 +345,8 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
|
||||
uint32 context_id)
|
||||
{
|
||||
struct pipe_rpc_fns *context_fns;
|
||||
+ const char *interface_name = NULL;
|
||||
+ bool ok;
|
||||
|
||||
DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n",
|
||||
get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), abstract)));
|
||||
@@ -390,12 +397,57 @@ static bool check_bind_req(struct pipes_
|
||||
return False;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
|
||||
+ abstract);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
context_fns->next = context_fns->prev = NULL;
|
||||
context_fns->n_cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_num_cmds(abstract);
|
||||
context_fns->cmds = rpc_srv_get_pipe_cmds(abstract);
|
||||
context_fns->context_id = context_id;
|
||||
context_fns->syntax = *abstract;
|
||||
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = lp_allow_dcerpc_auth_level_connect();
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * for the samr and the lsarpc interfaces we don't allow "connect"
|
||||
+ * auth_level by default.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id);
|
||||
+ if (ok) {
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_lsarpc.syntax_id);
|
||||
+ if (ok) {
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_netlogon.syntax_id);
|
||||
+ if (ok) {
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * for the epmapper and echo interfaces we allow "connect"
|
||||
+ * auth_level by default.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_epmapper.syntax_id);
|
||||
+ if (ok) {
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ ok = ndr_syntax_id_equal(abstract, &ndr_table_rpcecho.syntax_id);
|
||||
+ if (ok) {
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * every interface can be modified to allow "connect" auth_level by
|
||||
+ * using a parametric option like:
|
||||
+ * allow dcerpc auth level connect:<interface>
|
||||
+ * e.g.
|
||||
+ * allow dcerpc auth level connect:samr = yes
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ context_fns->allow_connect = lp_parm_bool(-1,
|
||||
+ "allow dcerpc auth level connect",
|
||||
+ interface_name, context_fns->allow_connect);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* add to the list of open contexts */
|
||||
|
||||
DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns );
|
||||
@@ -1736,6 +1788,7 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
|
||||
TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
|
||||
bool ret = False;
|
||||
PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns;
|
||||
+ const char *interface_name = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!p->pipe_bound) {
|
||||
DEBUG(1, ("Pipe not bound!\n"));
|
||||
@@ -1757,8 +1810,36 @@ static bool api_pipe_request(struct pipe
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ interface_name = get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(),
|
||||
+ &pipe_fns->syntax);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ SMB_ASSERT(interface_name != NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n",
|
||||
- get_pipe_name_from_syntax(talloc_tos(), &pipe_fns->syntax)));
|
||||
+ interface_name));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ switch (p->auth.auth_level) {
|
||||
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE:
|
||||
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY:
|
||||
+ case DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY:
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ default:
|
||||
+ if (!pipe_fns->allow_connect) {
|
||||
+ DEBUG(1, ("%s: restrict auth_level_connect access "
|
||||
+ "to [%s] with auth[type=0x%x,level=0x%x] "
|
||||
+ "on [%s] from [%s]\n",
|
||||
+ __func__, interface_name,
|
||||
+ p->auth.auth_type,
|
||||
+ p->auth.auth_level,
|
||||
+ derpc_transport_string_by_transport(p->transport),
|
||||
+ p->client_id->name));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED));
|
||||
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
if (!srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer(p, pkt, pipe_fns)) {
|
||||
DEBUG(1, ("srv_pipe_check_verification_trailer: failed\n"));
|
||||
--- a/source3/selftest/knownfail
|
||||
+++ b/source3/selftest/knownfail
|
||||
@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ samba3.posix_s3.nbt.dgram.*netlogon2
|
||||
samba3.*rap.sam.*.useradd # Not provided by Samba 3
|
||||
samba3.*rap.sam.*.userdelete # Not provided by Samba 3
|
||||
samba3.*rap.basic.*.netsessiongetinfo # Not provided by Samba 3
|
||||
+samba3.blackbox.rpcclient.over.ncacn_np.with.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
|
||||
+samba3.posix_s3.rpc.lsa.lookupsids.*ncacn_ip_tcp.*connect.* # we don't allow auth_level_connect anymore
|
||||
--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
|
||||
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
|
||||
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ if sub.returncode == 0:
|
||||
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
|
||||
elif t == "raw.samba3posixtimedlock":
|
||||
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmpguest -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --option=torture:localdir=$SELFTEST_PREFIX/dc/share')
|
||||
+ elif t == "rpc.samr.passwords.validate":
|
||||
+ plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", 'ncacn_np:$SERVER_IP[seal] -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ')
|
||||
else:
|
||||
plansmbtorturetestsuite(t, "s3dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD')
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
|
||||
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c
|
||||
@@ -6628,6 +6628,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ValidatePassword(struct p
|
||||
struct samr_GetDomPwInfo pw;
|
||||
struct samr_PwInfo dom_pw_info;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (p->auth.auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
|
||||
+ p->fault_state = DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
||||
+ return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (r->in.level < 1 || r->in.level > 3) {
|
||||
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue